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Introduction: 
It is clear that multinational corporations (MNCs) have significant impact in the growth 
trajectory of developing countries. The nature of this relationship, however, is heavily debated. 
What is the downstream impact from MNCs on the lives of workers in developing countries? 
Are countries perversely incentivized to repress and exploit their unskilled labor forces to attract 
investment? Do multinationals promote better working conditions and raise standards of living 
for workers? In this essay, I argue that multinationals have the potential to bring massive benefits 
to the working class in developing countries. If the government of the host country develops 
strong linkage institutions, connecting MNCs to a large portion of the labor force and promoting 
information sharing, MNCs can bring increases in wage levels, decreases in inequality, and 
increased standards of living overall. My study combines quantitative analysis and case study 
research to explore the effects of MNCs on six developing Latin American economies: 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela.  
To preview my main findings, there are strong correlations in all countries between 
foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (a proxy variable for MNC involvement) and 
adjusted net national incomes. I also show that overall levels of FDI coming into a developing 
economy evidence a more significant relationship with income levels than do their relative share 
of that economy’s market, indicating that industry domination is not as important as the total 
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amount of incoming FDI. The data also shows that increased exposure to foreign capital appears 
to lead to absolute wealth gains across the economy. In other words, all income groups are made 
absolutely better off by increased MNC involvement. However, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that the gains associated with FDI are not evenly distributed across income brackets, that 
the benefits to the wealthy are disproportionate to those to the poor. Finally, the data shows a 
good deal of support for the theory that different periods of FDI development affect and 
enfranchise different groups in different ways. When MNCs initially enter a country, in the early 
stages of development, we see strong associations between increased levels of FDI and increased 
Human Development Index (HDI) scores. As time goes on, and peripheral economies adapt and 
shift their development strategies, the relationship becomes weaker and appears to plateau. The 
central goal of this essay is to explore the extent to which predictions from the established 
literature hold true in select countries in Latin America, with an eye toward what their 
experiences can say about the impact of MNC FDI more broadly. 
 
Overview: 
This paper is structured as follows. First I review the literature on MNC involvement, 
centering on the debate over the existence of a “Race to the Bottom,” and its counterpart, the 
“Climb to the Top.” Second, I present my hypotheses and variables derived from that literature. 
Third, I present a series of paired case study analyses: Mexico and Venezuela, Colombia and 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala. Evidence will be presented on a country-by-country basis 
as well as in a cross-sectional comparison. Finally, I summarize my findings in a concluding 
section with attention to what the findings suggest for out of sample cases. Tables and Figures 
referenced in my case studies can be found in the appendices following my bibliography. 
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Literature Review: 
In order to properly understand the nuanced and varied ways in which MNCs have 
impacted and altered the development trajectories of periphery countries, we must engage the 
vibrant debate over the two primary poles in development theory. The first group, a large cohort 
of anti-globalization scholars informed by the Marxist canon, has formed around one central 
critique — the “Race to the Bottom.” Drawing on dependency theory, Race to the Bottom 
theorists propose that in order to attract MNCs and FDI, countries systematically lower their 
standards for worker protection, wage levels, and environmental standards. The second group 
finds its footing among the Austrian and Friedmanian disciplines, popularized as the “Climb to 
the Top”. These theorists stress the positive correlations between rule of law (RoL) and MNC 
involvement, focusing on the absolute gains associated with globalization, rather than the relative 
gains emphasized by their Race to the Bottom peers. Climb to the Top theorists are primarily 
concerned with long-run aggregate analyses, whereas Race to the Bottom theorists focus on 
cross-sectional and case study approaches to construct their arguments.  
Race to the Bottom theory draws heavily on dependency theory, the operating 
assumption of which is that as peripheral countries develop, they will become more closely 
intertwined with and dependent upon developed economies for resources and capital. A central 
player in this dynamic is the MNC, which enters a developing country, out-competing domestic 
producers, eroding private sector autonomy and making the host country reliant on it for goods, 
capital, and technologies. Responding to this fear, many developing countries pursue an Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) development strategy, insulating their domestic businesses 
and limiting or even prohibiting the entry of MNCs. 
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Building on the work of previous dependency scholars, Peter Evans shows how the 
economic system put in place under imperialism created a stagnant Brazilian economy (Evans 
1979). Evans postulates that due to the economic incentives in place, the main outcome of 
imperialism was to impede and control the growth of underdeveloped countries. He explicates 
three main groups: the international capitalists (MNCs), the local government, and the local 
bourgeois (Evans 1979). Stage by stage, these three agents stripped the underdeveloped 
periphery economies of development possibilities. The resulting system was a rapacious alliance 
between monopolists, landowners, and compradors, all dedicated to maintaining the status quo. 
High volumes of low value added products were exported to the metropole and high value added 
products imported in return. Despite often running trade surpluses, this form of trade only 
deepened the divide between the working class and the compradors in the periphery.  
Dependent development necessitated the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few in 
order to continue producing low value added goods. Because the economies of the periphery, the 
wages of their workers, and their access to capital were so intimately intertwined with the 
metropole, they became increasingly vulnerable to economic shocks in the capital exporting 
economies. Due to the low value added nature of the commodities exported by the periphery, 
economic shocks to the metropole will have drastic implications on the developing world. As 
such, MNCs lock the developing world into a state of delayed or stagnant development. They 
inhibit technological innovation and capital accumulation in the periphery, and encourage the 
development of a highly unequal economic structure (Evans 1979). Evans attributes much of the 
economic uncertainty and volatility in the periphery to this highly dependent relationship (Evans 
1979).  
Evans argues that the rules of the game, the institutional apparatus constructed around the 
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market, are crucial to how players will operate (Evans 1995). In line with the Weberian ideal, 
Evans’ optimal state features an effective and streamlined bureaucracy. The theory proposes that 
if institutions are constructed in such a way as to promote effective and fair RoL, and establish 
robust impartial bureaucracies, MNCs will be able to enter and compete with domestic 
businesses, increasing the productivity and the wages of the workers in host states. If the 
bureaucracy is too inefficient and cumbersome, such as in the case of Brazil, domestic firms will 
be unable to develop fully and will not compete effectively with MNCs. The goal for Evans is to 
create a bureaucratic apparatus that is embedded — fully ingrained in the state and market — 
and autonomous — free from popular controls. He acknowledges the almost impossible nature of 
this duality, but still stresses the need to strive towards this sort of system (Evans 1995).  
Going a step beyond Evans' claims, Anita Chan argues that exports and global orientation 
will not benefit a developing country (Chan 2003). “Globalization scarcely leads to improved 
wage conditions for the workers who make goods for export compared to the populace at large” 
(Chan 2003, 46). Her view, emblematic of Race to the Bottom literature as a whole, contends 
that a host country will remove protective barriers and minimum wage requirements for workers 
in export sectors. She believes that intra-firm competition, though it may well exist, will not be 
enough to outweigh the competition between countries, which she sees as putting downward 
pressure on wage levels. 
In her discussion of Chinese labor law, Chan explains the Hukou system, a system of 
formal and informal laws that keep migrant workers within China in positions of poverty, unable 
to access higher wages or expand their rights. This system restricts where workers are legally 
allowed to live, preventing them from relocating to find adequate or better paying jobs. Chan 
asserts that a large reason for the continued existence of this law is the bargaining power and 
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influence of MNCs (Chan 2003). In seeking lower labor standards, manufacturing companies 
have done what they can to influence Chinese policy, supporting the continued implementation 
of this law, which guarantees them a steady supply of non-migratory laborers. Without the ability 
to relocate for a better job, Chan argues, workers have very little bargaining power and are 
largely at the mercy of MNCs. 
Chan shows that although massive amounts of FDI and a sizable cadre of MNCs have 
flowed into China, the benefits of this increased supply of capital have been narrowly confined. 
“As a region becomes more prosperous, it violates the national guidelines and seeks to maintain 
its attractiveness to foreign capital by keeping its minimum wage level low, in order to compete 
with other localities in China in selling the labor of migrant workers. The benefits of 
globalization in accordance with this competitive logic have not, and will not, trickle down to 
those who make the products” (Chan 2003, 46). Chan argues that working conditions have 
declined in China in the wake of globalization. She sees this dynamic as direct proof of the 
existence of Race to the Bottom incentives. This claim stands in direct opposition to the causal 
theory at the heart of Climb to the Top literature. 
China’s central government has played a direct role in the reduction of minimum wages 
throughout the country. “The central government has intervened in a way that encourages even 
lower pay. Though migrant workers’ wages in Guangdong province are very low, the central 
government has been worried that Guangdong is pricing itself out of the international market. 
The government therefore has started to encourage foreign capital to move inland, to places 
where the pay is even lower” (Chan 2003, 46). Although Climb to the Top theorists would see 
this as potential for competition between interior Chinese firms and MNCs (a relationship they 
believe leads to increased wage levels), Chan is far more pessimistic. She believes the 
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introduction of manufacturing MNCs to the Chinese interior, predominantly rural markets, will 
provide substantive incentives for further reductions in the already minuscule rural average 
income (Chan 2003). This negative relationship between rural wages and the presence of 
manufacturing MNCs is distinct to Race to the Bottom theory. 
Writing some 25 years after Evans, Martin Wolf claims that MNCs do not seek to exploit 
or dominate their host countries (Wolf 2004). “The bottom line is that corporations have 
influence, but not decisive power […the fear that] democracy will founder under the assault of 
corporate interests is wildly exaggerated” (Wolf 2004, 247). He wrote about an economic system 
that looks starkly different from the one Evans was observing. By the time Wolf was writing, 
MNCs were no longer solely engaged in manufacturing and resource extraction, periphery 
economies had grown enormously, and there was far more competition from within periphery 
economies. Indeed, the very differentiation between periphery and metropole was beginning to 
blur. Wolf stresses the limited power of MNCs and their motivation — profit maximization — 
distinct in his view from political manipulation and bribery.  
Wolf claims the host country remains in the dominant position, dictating the capacity and 
actions of MNCs through constraints on MNC action. “Even the weakest states can force people 
to do things most of them would very much prefer not to do […] companies [can] not. They are 
civilian organizations that must win their resources in the marketplace” (Wolf 2004, 223). In 
Wolf’s framing, the state remains the dominant player, setting the rules of the game, and 
regulating the actions of companies and corporations (Wolf 2004). 
The production shift to global supply chains dramatically changed the opportunities 
available to domestic businesses. Increased complexity of production encouraged participation of 
domestic producers to supply and compete with MNCs. The backward linkages formed during 
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this era of multinationalism distinguish it from earlier, extractive production, spreading gains to 
developing economies.  
Wolf claims that what draws multinationals more than anything is RoL. “The more 
advanced the rule of law, […] the higher the direct foreign investment. […] The great bulk of 
direct investment continues to go to countries with high labor costs and strong regulatory 
regimes” (Wolf 2004, 233). Analyzing data gathered by the World Bank, Wolf shows that one of 
the largest determining factors for MNC investment choice is often consistency (Wolf 2004). 
Though labor costs will have an impact on the profitability of a firm in the short run, long run 
survivability is far more dependent on the consistency and reliability of the host country’s 
regime. Wolf sees China in a much different light than Chan, calling it “the most economically 
successful developing economy since 1980” (Wolf 2004, 234). He sees the lack of regime 
change, relative economic stability, and consistent laws regulating the behavior of MNCs within 
China as strong attractors of FDI.  
In exploring NIC development trajectories, Stephan Haggard argues against dependency 
theorists showing that although MNC involvement was high at the beginning of Export Oriented 
Growth (EOG), it shrank as a relative value to the share of the market held by domestic firms 
(Haggard 1990). In Taiwan, for example, “when exports are weighted by the share of foreign 
ownership, the role of foreign investment starts smaller and drops more sharply” (Haggard 1990, 
202). Though having a good deal of influence initially, MNC power is quickly diluted by 
domestic businesses, who are prompted by competition and government incentives to increase 
productivity. Countries pursuing EOG would allow MNCs easier access to their markets, forcing 
budding firms to compete to survive. Haggard highlights the success of these policies, showing 
that increased openness to MNC involvement led to substantial growth and development in 
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Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea (Haggard 1990).  
Jagdish Bhagwati emphatically refutes the existence of the Race to the Bottom. 
“Multinationals, generally speaking, do not go streaking to where labor rights are ignored or 
flouted” (Bhagwati 2004, 130). This finding, supported by Wolf, is key to understanding the 
nature of MNC involvement in the Climb to the Top model. Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya 
show substantial evidence that the presence of MNCs increases the living condition of the 
working class (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013).  
Bhagwati and Panagariya provide further empirical evidence in the form of a case study 
of India’s development to support these claims about the benefits from MNC involvement. They 
show that during a period of ISI protectionism, India’s economy stagnated (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya 2013). As policy makers began to reform India’s economic policy in the 80’s, 
Bhagwati and Panagariya show the substantial economic benefits, many of which were captured 
by the poor. Their claim boils down to a simple relationship: more employment means less 
poverty. As MNCs entered India, they increased demand for labor, pulling rural farmers out of 
abject poverty into the cities (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013). Their work demonstrates a clear 
link between globalization and economic development in India. 
Paolo Figini and Holger Görg explore this initial dynamic further in a case study of 
Ireland’s recent development. Figini and Görg show that initially the demand for labor created a 
spike in inequality, but as more firms entered the market, the market reached an inequality 
maximum of sorts. After this apex, the addition of further competition caused a reduction in 
inequality. Contrary to Race to the Bottom theory, this reduction was not at the expense of the 
initially elevated workforce, but rather the result of an increase in the wages offered to the 
remaining workers (Figini and Görg 1999).  
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James Crotty, Gerald Epstein, and Patricia Kelly argue that the effects of FDI and MNC 
involvement are directly dependent on the form of the regime in which they take root (Crotty, 
Epstein, and Kelly 1989). They argue that the power and influence of MNCs are contingent on 
levels of international aggregate demand, the nature of competition in their host markets, and the 
domestic and international regulations and rules of play.  
In order to tease out the underlying foundation for a given country’s political and 
economic institutions, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson construct a model 
for explaining divergence in economic development trajectories and political institutions in the 
periphery, based on the death rates of European settlers during colonization (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 2001). Their theory is that a legacy of imperial institutions heavily influences 
modern institutions. Drawing on path dependency theory, their model suggests that European 
colonizers imposed different types of institutions based on the expected death rates of early 
settlers. Their work shows high correlations between early colonial death rates, current levels of 
development, and forms of political institutions. Their findings support Evans' claims that the 
historical alliances formed during imperialism have long-standing ramifications for modern 
development. They also provide support for Wolf’s theory that host governments have a 
dominant role in the process of development vis-à-vis MNC involvement and potential for 
action. Their work can be seen as an amplification of Wolf’s conclusion about the power of 
government, suggesting that the most important and powerful factor contributing to the 
development trajectory of a periphery economy is not the presence or absence of MNCs, but of a 
history of MNC and imperial involvement in the host country’s early years. They make note of 
the fact that institutions are resistant to change, a sentiment echoed by Evans and other new 
institutionalists. If they are correct that modern institutions are both highly determined by a 
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history of colonial institutions and also slow to change, their theories could have substantive 
ramifications for the developing world. Countries that did not inherit beneficial institutions from 
colonialism must then take steps to establish those institutions early on in their development 
processes.  
Benjamin Powell shows that by and large MNCs offer substantially higher wages than 
their domestic competitors (Powell 2008). Most protested companies still offer higher wages 
than their competitors. Paul Krugman corroborates these findings. He testifies to the measurable 
benefits incurred from export industries, and argues that protesting sweatshops will serve as a 
substantial blow to the working class of the host country, perhaps even reversing the progress 
made in a given country during a period of MNC involvement (Krugman 1997). 
Not all agree on this dynamic however. Mehrene Larudee and Tim Koechlin are skeptical 
of the reliability of data offered by MNCs about their factor costs and operations. Larudee and 
Koechlin argue that the wage gap between MNCs and domestic firms is actually far smaller than 
Powell has found (Larudee and Koechlin 1999). They postulate that isolated geographic 
competition largely influences this phenomenon. The positive correlation between MNC wages 
and domestic wages is isolated to small regions, and not distributed throughout the economy 
(Larudee and Koechlin 1999). However, Bhagwati and Panagariya do a good job of showing the 
immensely diffused effects of MNC involvement (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013).  
 
Type of MNC Involvement: 
There is a strong temporal aspect to this debate. Multinationals have manifested in 
distinct forms in different eras with drastically different implications for host economies. There 
are three main eras of MNC investment that demand our attention: extractive, productive, and 
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high-tech multinationalism. The first category, extractive multinationalism, is marked by a strong 
alliance between military and private enterprise from the metropole in extracting natural 
resources from the host economy. It is not until the second form of MNC involvement, 
productive multinationalism, that benefits from MNC investment begin to be seen in the 
periphery. This second form of MNC involvement manifests as low-skill manufacturing, service 
jobs, and highly routinized industrial production. It is this second era over which the debate has 
been the most intense. The third form, high-tech multinationalism, is marked by a high 
concentration of FDI in high-tech industries. It is a generally held belief that backward linkages 
formed during this third stage between MNCs and local firms will lead to enhanced 
technological proficiency, increased knowledge, and access to more advanced means of 
production across the domestic economy.  
 
Oil: 
There are three main competing views on the impact of petroleum on a given country’s 
development trajectory. Michael Ross’ work has sought to explore the relationship oil has on 
economic as well as social development. His findings show a strong relationship between the 
national production of oil, poor economic policies, heightened levels of corruption, and the 
oppression of women. Because petroleum oriented MNCs operate in isolated, remote regions, 
employing foreign labor, using imported machinery and building materials, they do not actually 
compete in a host economy. Rather, they exist outside the regular economy of a host country, 
providing massive revenues to the host government in the form of resource use fees (Ross 2012). 
One of his main contributions to the canon is demonstrating the direct negative impact an oil 
industry has on the economic development of the rest of the economy (Ross, 2012). 
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Victor Menaldo has taken a different stance. His work advances the belief that instead of 
oil, institutions are the cause of poor economic development. He argues that countries with poor 
institutions, such as tax collection problems, will rely heavily on petroleum rents in order to 
finance their growth (Menaldo, 2016). Venezuela and Mexico are prime examples of this 
dynamic. Mexico has a robust and established tax collection system, allowing the Mexican 
government to collect a good deal of revenue from the population at large. This contributes to a 
relatively representative government and public policy that addresses wealth redistribution. 
Venezuela, on the other hand, does not have the same well-established tax collection institutions. 
As a result, the government was forced to focus development strategies on oil rents in order to 
fund social welfare programs. 
Under these conditions, Menaldo argues that industrialization will occur through crony, 
not competitive, capitalism. Taking advantage of high inequality and political institutions, elites 
will use politicized financing and seignorage in order to consolidate power. The high transaction 
costs in political systems with poor institutions will push elites toward policies that consolidate 
political power and perpetuate high levels of inequality. This is especially true for oil extraction, 
as host country elites will encourage explorations and new wells as a way of increasing 
economic and political gains. 
Finally, Thad Dunning’s work straddles the two theories, arguing that both good and bad 
economic and political institutions can be the result of — or reinforced by — a large petroleum 
sector. In line with Jan Teorell’s work on democratization, Dunning argues that a large oil 
industry can reinforce both autocratic and democratic regimes. By providing rents gained 
without the implementation of income taxes, oil production can allow for a relatively 
autonomous and unrepresentative government. Citizens are provided with government-funded 
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programs, financed by oil rents, which smooth over issues of inequality and lack of 
representation. Relatively consistent oil revenue can allow a country, such as Venezuela, to 
develop and grow without needing to address high levels of inequality (Dunning, 2008). In such 
a case, the presence of MNCs and inflows of FDI into the oil industry can ensure steady revenue 
streams to the government. Venezuela provides compelling evidence for this dynamic, with 
higher levels of foreign investment allowing for increased social welfare institutions. The 
downside to such development strategy is that when the underlying price of oil inevitably drops 
to a level where the country can no longer finance its public programs, demands for wealth 
redistribution dramatically increase. 
 
Causal Mechanisms 
Before proceeding to the specification of hypotheses, this section briefly summarizes the 
causal mechanisms at play in the literature reviewed thus far. Bhagwati’s and Panagariya’s work 
is emblematic of the logic at the heart of Climb to the Top theories. Their mechanism highlights 
competition between MNCs and local firms as a primary motivator for productivity and 
efficiency enhancements, and accompanying economic development in peripheral economies. As 
MNCs enter a host country, they will hire large numbers of previously unemployed workers. 
This will increase demand for labor in the host economy, giving bargaining power to workers 
and increasing the wages offered by domestic, competing companies. As wages rise, people will 
be pulled into urban areas from rural communities, gaining opportunities for political 
socialization. In order to increase worker productivity, MNCs will begin to educate their 
workforce. Although modest at first, this education will allow for stratification of the workforce, 
and will lay the foundation for a middle class. The children raised by these new workers will 
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grow up with increased levels of socialization and education (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013). 
Over time, Bhagwati and Panagariya believe that the introduction of competitive manufacturing 
MNCs will lead to higher levels of income, socialization, education, and political rights for all 
groups in the host country. This mechanism is not concerned with analyzing relative gains, and 
specifically addresses the long run average growth trajectories of developing economies. 
Evans argues that the causal mechanism used by Bhagwati and Panagariya is inherently 
flawed (Evans 1979). Because there is little incentive for the development of a middle class in 
the periphery, no link exists between increased MNC involvement and a growing middle class 
(Evans 1979). Dependent development will instead result in the development of the wealthy 
bourgeoisie, and a large, predominantly poor working class. Even if the poor are made better off 
in absolute terms, Evans argues they will be relatively worse off compared to the wealthy. His 
tripartite model incorporates political power as a means for maintaining the highly unequal 
economic stability favorable to dependent development. The coercive aspects of the state are 
accentuated and a tendency toward repression is developed. Evans sees this as largely driven by 
economic necessity (Evans 1979). Depressed wages keep the products of the host economy 
internationally competitive, and the concentration of income emboldens the luxury goods 
market, drawing in imports for the metropole. It is due to this articulation, he argues, that the 
local economy does not display any relationship between wage levels and the process of 
industrialization (Evans 1979). 
Furthermore, Evans argues that developing economies are prevented from undergoing the 
same process of development that occurred during the industrial revolution in Europe and the 
United States (Evans 1979). When MNCs enter a country, they bring with them only those 
modes of production already routinized and largely optimized (Evans 1979). By and large the 
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innovation associated with the technology being used is done long before the production is 
exported to the periphery from the metropole. Bringing only highly routinized technology with 
little potential for further innovation, MNCs inadvertently rob the host economies of the period 
of capital accumulation and technical innovation necessary to the development process.  
Layna Mosley (Mosley and Uno 2007) highlights the complicated nature of this debate. 
Mosley shows that there exist both pressure on countries for the Race to the Bottom and 
incentives for the Climb to the Top. The downward pressure, she claims, is the result of 
international trade arrangements. In order to attract business, developing countries will consent 
to trade agreements that restrict the bargaining power of unions, lower labor regulations, and 
reduce environmental standards. At the same time, endogenous pressure from MNCs and 
domestic firms motivates increased rights for workers and higher salaries. In keeping with 
Evans, Haggard, and Wolf, Mosley finds that the outcome ultimately depends on how the 
country is integrated into the global economy. The rules of the game absolutely matter to the 
formation of incentives and the existence of either a Race to the Bottom or a Climb to the Top. 
She finds a strong correlation between increased democracy, income, and civil conflict and 
worker rights (Mosley and Uno 2007). This finding is in line with Bhagwati and Panagariya’s 
emphasis on the importance of growth incentives.  
In sum, the Climb to the Top theorists stress absolute, longitudinal comparisons, and deal 
primarily with productive MNCs in relatively competitive international markets. As a result, 
their work tends to downplay the importance of case study analysis, emphasizing aggregate data 
and insisting that absolute growth is the target worth addressing. Race to the Bottom theorists, on 
the other hand, focus on relative comparisons between the haves and the have nots, emphasizing 
cross-sectional comparisons. Their work utilizes case study analyses, stressing relative 
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comparisons of income levels and economic growth. Because of these divergent methodological 
approaches, the two groups regularly draw opposing conclusions. The goal of this study is to 
reconcile their dissenting opinions, analyzing their mechanisms on their own terms, and seeing to 
what extent their theories hold true in the Latin American experience. 
 
Hypotheses and Variables: 
The core argument of this paper is that the most significant determining factor for how 
MNCs will affect the lives of workers in developing economies is mode of MNC production 
(extractive, productive, or high-tech). In order to support this hypothesis, I must test the 
robustness of the claims made in the literature. Since the Race to the Bottom and Climb to the 
Top theories assume inverse outcomes, we can test the strength of both by testing the robustness 
of one. If neither is shown to be valid, we can conclude that there is some variation not explained 
by the standard models, providing support for my thesis. I have chosen to explore the validity of 
Climb to the Top theory in my sample cases. Controlling for regional differences and the 
presence or absence of an oil industry, I explore the relationship between MNC involvement and 
absolute income growth of the poor in a selection of countries. I measure the different effects of 
one central independent variable — MNC involvement. Unfortunately, the data concerning 
MNC involvement is spotty at best, therefore as a proxy variable I will be looking at FDI inflow 
data collected from both the World Bank data set and the KOF Index of Globalization. By 
looking at FDI Figures, I expect to capture at least a rough picture of MNC investment patterns 
within a given country over a period of time. This is by no means a perfect fit. As J. Steven 
Landefeld and Ralph Kozlow point out, a great deal of work is needed in the form of in-depth 
case study analysis of MNCs before the available data can be seen as truly satisfactory 
  
Moss 18 
 
(Landefeld and Kozlow 2003). With this in mind, I have chosen to focus simply on the effect of 
FDI, as a proxy for MNC involvement, on the incomes of workers in developing countries. 
In order to understand the relevance of the literature to the Latin American experience, I 
explore the basic causal mechanisms put forward by both competing perspectives on FDI. I test 
the effect of MNC involvement on four dependent variables at the country level: the adjusted net 
national income per capita, the Gini coefficient score — a ratio measure of inequality — the 
Human Development Index (HDI) score, and the relative and absolute levels of wealth held by 
different income groups within the country (see bibliography for data sources). Adjusted net 
national income per capita and HDI variables will be lagged two years and the Gini coefficient 
will be lagged five years behind the independent variable.  
As a second independent variable, I test the presence or absence of an oil industry with at 
least $100 per capita income per year generated by petroleum extraction on the same dependent 
variables. This is to test Ross’ proposition that oil economies lack the same mechanisms linking 
MNCs to the bulk of the workforce. According to the Climb to the Top literature, increased 
MNC activity should reduce inequality. As more people are employed and the middle class 
grows, the dispersion of resources becomes increasingly equitable. As inequality decreases and 
the average worker wage increases, we expect to see an increase in the HDI, life expectancy, and 
education levels. From this, we can conclude that as MNC involvement in a country increases, it 
is reasonable to expect to see a resulting increase in the country’s HDI score. 
 
Hypotheses: 
H1: Increased MNC involvement will result in positive change in average 
incomes across all areas of the economy, expressed as a percent increase in the 
adjusted net national income per capita. This measure accounts for fixed 
consumption and natural resource depletion. 
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H2: Increased MNC involvement will decrease the levels of income inequality in 
the country. 
 
H3: Increased MNC involvement will increase level of human development 
within the country. 
 
H4: Increased MNC involvement will increase absolute income levels across all 
income groups. 
 
H5: Increased MNC involvement will decrease the gap between relative income 
levels between the top and bottom ten percent. 
 
Alt. H: H1-H5 will not hold true in oil producing host countries.  
 
Case Studies: 
In order to partially control for cultural variation, regional differences, and historical 
differences, I have chosen to examine countries only in Latin America. Within my sample, I 
selected what I believe to be a robust and varied group, capturing a range of population sizes and 
geographical traits, including both developing and developed, oil and non-oil states represented. 
Between the two major oil producers, Venezuela and Mexico, we see varied development 
approaches, as well as a large difference in political systems and histories of MNC involvement. 
Colombia and Costa Rica allow us to explore the impact of extractive multinationalism as 
compared to high-tech multinational production. Honduras and Guatemala show us variation in 
the developmental impact of different forms of MNC production on highly impoverished 
economies. The tables and figures referenced below can be found in the appendix section at the 
end of the paper. 
 
Data Interpretation: 
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The data from this study shows key areas of divergence from the standard model of 
Climb to the Top theory. The findings suggest that there are very few generalizable traits across 
all forms of MNC investment. Rather, data shows that different forms of MNC FDI have widely 
varied effects on developing economies. Table 1 shows strong correlations in all countries in this 
study between FDI net inflows and adjusted net national incomes support H1. The strongest 
relationship is found in Costa Rica, which as a major tourist hub and high value-added export 
manufacturer, is to be expected. The strong relationship shown across the sample suggests that 
the causal mechanism undergirding H1, linking FDI and income levels, may be robust in Latin 
America. 
When examining the impact of FDI measured as a percentage of total GDP on national 
incomes, this relationship grows weaker. In all countries except Venezuela, there is still a strong 
correlation, although with the exception of Honduras, this relationship is significantly weaker 
than with overall levels of spending. This finding casts doubt on some of Evans’ claims (Evans 
1979). Specifically, it shows that overall levels of FDI coming into a developing economy 
evidence a more significant relationship with income levels than do their relative share of that 
economy’s market. H1 is again supported. This relationship slightly undermines Evans’ tripartite 
alliance of foreign capital, local compradors, and local government by showing that industry 
domination is not as important as the total amount of incoming FDI. Part of his theory is how the 
interactions between these three classes are engineered to pull in as much capital and profit for 
the participating entities as possible. The strong correlations seen between FDI inflows (both as a 
percentage and in absolute terms) and net national incomes provide a great deal of support for 
the existence of such an alliance, while reinforcing H1.  
The data in Table 1 shows no correlation between FDI and change in the GINI coefficient 
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for all countries in the study. We do see a slightly negative association between the two variables 
in all countries except for Venezuela. Although given the lack of significance of these 
correlations, it may not be productive to read too much into that relationship. What we can say is 
that the data shown above does not support H2. We find no relationship between increased MNC 
involvement and reduced inequality.  
Figures 1 through 12 display both relative and absolute wealth distributions for six 
countries. Relative shares of overall wealth and absolute wealth held by each observed income 
bracket is graphed temporally. These graphical representations allow for comparisons in both 
absolute levels of wealth growth and rates of wealth accumulation. An important note to make at 
the outset is that even though “absolute wealth” is used, relative comparisons of the data 
represented by such Figures can still be made. Similarly, we can attempt absolute comparisons of 
our “relative” data. The terms used for each Figure simply represent the way the data is 
presented. “Relative” Figures display percentage distributions of wealth over time. “Absolute” 
Figures display the total amount of wealth commanded each year (based on the corresponding 
percentage of wealth possessed by each income group in a given year). What we are primarily 
concerned with is addressing the relative comparisons between the top and bottom 10% and the 
absolute growth of each group. The middle 20% group has been added to give some indication of 
the distribution of wealth throughout the economy, although most of the critiques drawn from the 
literature review focus on the normal curve tails (high and low). For that reason, we will be 
primarily addressing the attributes of the top and bottom 10%.  
For simplicity of purpose, we begin with an absolute comparison approach, consistent 
with Climb theorists. Followed by a relative comparisons approach, echoing the Race to the 
Bottom literature. Starting with Colombia, we see a noticeable absolute shift in the total amount 
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of wealth owned by the bottom 10%. Over the 30 years of available data, the bottom 10% 
increased their total wealth tenfold. Table 3 shows a strong correlation between increased FDI 
inflows and increases in the absolute income of the bottom 10%, significant at the .001 level. 
Indeed, we see evidence of possible effects of FDI on income in absolute terms across all three 
groups in all countries except Venezuela. Guatemala has the lowest level of significance, 
significant only at the .1 level, although here too we see across the board a significant correlation 
between FDI inflows and absolute incomes. Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 reinforce this dynamic, 
showing that in each country, except again Venezuela, the absolute wealth of the lowest 10% has 
increased over the observed period of time. Moreover, the absolute levels of wealth for the top 
10% and middle 20% have also increased. The correlations are in keeping with our findings of 
the effect of FDI on net national incomes. We do not see just one group benefiting in a vacuum. 
Consistent with H1 and H4, increased exposure to foreign capital appears to lead to absolute 
wealth gains across the economy. 
Transitioning to a relative comparison, we do not see the same strength of relationship 
between FDI and relative shares of wealth. Although many of the Figures display nominally 
positive trends, the slope of those trend lines is rather small. The percentage of national wealth 
held by the bottom 10% in Colombia, for example, has a slope of only m = .0002. What is more, 
we do not see consistently significant correlations between FDI and share of wealth, as we saw 
with FDI and absolute levels of wealth. Table 2 shows that only three countries, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Mexico, display any sort of significant relationships between relative wealth and 
FDI. In Guatemala, an agrarian economy with a high concentration of multinational investment 
in extractive industry, we see a negative relationship between FDI and the income share of the 
bottom 10%, and a positive relationship between FDI and the income share of the top 10%. This 
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violates H4 and H5, while providing yet more evidence to expand the alternative hypothesis to 
include all forms of extractive multinationalism, not simply countries with large oil industries. 
The middle class has been largely unaffected by increases in FDI, but the lowest income group 
has suffered and the rich have benefited. Mexico displays similar relationships between FDI and 
the wealthy, although it is worth noting that the relative income of the middle 20% has also gone 
up. The form FDI takes in Mexico, namely industrial productive manufacture, can likewise 
explain this. In keeping with H1, H4 and H5, industrial manufacturing is associated with higher 
levels of wealth for the middle class.  
In assessing the data on wealth distribution, it is important to take into account the large 
divide between Race and Climb theorists over how to best analyze progress. Climb theorists such 
as Wolf, Bhagwati, and Haggard have built their theories upon a platform of absolute growth 
comparisons. In contrast, the Race to the Bottom theorists like Chan have worked within the 
realm of relative comparisons, stressing the importance of comparing relative access to capital, 
bargaining power, and wealth between groups. In addition to these contrasting analytical 
perspectives, it is important to keep in mind how different eras of FDI might affect development. 
Early colonialism represents the first stage of FDI in its true sense, followed by a dependent 
development phase under ISI policies, and later by EOG development strategies.  
Figures 2 and 4 illustrate these eras of shifting development and marked changes in 
equity relationships between the different classes studied. Figure 2 shows the wealth held by 
different groups over the last thirty years in Colombia. Between 2003 and 2004, there is a 
dramatic shift in the rate of growth of the absolute income share held by the top 10%. This 
coincides with the beginning of the disarmament process and easing of tensions between 
guerrilla, paramilitary, and military forces in Colombia. This easing allowed for increased 
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multinational investment into extractive industries, principally petroleum and coal. It is in no 
way coincidental that the increased access of extractive multinationals to Colombia has 
coincided with an increase in the rate of wealth accumulation of the top 10%. Here we see 
evidence to support the alternative hypothesis; the presence of an oil industry has violated H5. 
Figure 4 illustrates a similar relationship in Costa Rica. These two Figures are most intriguing 
due to the similarities in the different forms of multinationalism they depict. The increase seen in 
Costa Rica is largely due to the presence of high-tech MNCs. This provides evidence to suggest 
that in Costa Rica, high-tech manufacturing has had a very similar impact on the divergence of 
growth rates of wealth held by the 10% and the rest of the population as has extractive 
multinationalism in Colombia. This finding suggest an important addendum for the alternative 
hypothesis; the only form of multinationalism that will satisfy H1-5 is productive 
multinationalism. 
The same transition is not seen in the rates of growth for the bottom 10% in Costa Rica, 
nor the middle 20%. This means that although the average per capita GDP of the country rose 
significantly around 2005, the gains associated with the increase were captured primarily by the 
top 10%. Although these two countries exhibit dramatic curvilinear growth rates for the top 10%, 
all countries in the sample, including Venezuela, show larger rates of growth for the top 10% 
than for the other two income groups. The rates of growth for the bottom 10% are significantly 
lower; they are barely positive, indicating a plateauing in the relative gains associated with FDI 
inflows to the bottom 10%. This data shows strong evidence against the robustness of H5. The 
top 10% grow in wealth at rates that far outstrip the rates of growth of the poorest 10%. Drawing 
on this relative comparison, we can conclude that there is strong evidence to suggest that the 
gains associated with FDI are not evenly distributed across income brackets. H5 does not hold 
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true. 
Looking at HDI levels and FDI inflows in Figure 13, there is support for H3: as foreign 
companies move into a developing economy, the overall standards of living will rise. With the 
exception of Venezuela, we see dramatic increases in HDI as FDI increases. Decade to decade, 
countries display higher HDI levels as FDI is increased. The trend lines have been drawn to 
illustrate this point, but given the relatively small sample size these findings should not be 
extrapolated to apply to cases outside this study. What we see is strong evidence in support of 
H3. People in general are made better off over time by increased levels of globalization and 
foreign direct investment. The trend lines also show that although there is a positive correlation 
across the three decades observed between FDI and HDI levels, the relationship seems to exhibit 
diminishing returns to scale. This is to say that although we observe positive correlations 
between our variables, there is a plateauing effect in the data. This provides support for the 
theory that different periods of FDI development affect and enfranchise different groups in 
different ways. When just entering a country, in the early stages of development, we see strong 
associations between increased levels of FDI and increased HDI score. As time goes on and 
periphery economies adapt and shift their development strategies, perhaps pursuing EOG or ISI, 
or trapped in Evans’ dependent development, the relationship becomes weaker and appears to 
plateau.  
 
Mexico: 
Mexico plays a pivotal part in this comparative case-study analysis. Mexico is one of the 
highest recipients of FDI in the world, second only to Brazil in the region. Its close proximity to 
the U.S., as well as its participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has 
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led to a great deal of temporal variation as to the form of FDI within its economy. Unlike 
Venezuela, the majority of FDI flowing into Mexico is concentrated in three key manufacturing 
subsectors: machinery and equipment, chemical substances, and textiles and leather products 
(Pacheco-López, 2005). The concentration of MNC involvement in these manufacturing 
subsectors is important to understand Mexican economic development in comparison with that of 
the other case studies. 
Alexandre O. Vera-Cruz & Gabriela Dutrénit explore the spillover effects of these MNC 
investments on the Mexican economy at large. Their findings show that firms with founders, 
engineers, or managers that have previously worked for multinationals show higher 
competitiveness, have higher levels of market influence, and have higher managerial and 
technological capabilities than other domestic firms (Vera-Cruz and Dutrénit, 2005). Their work 
focused primarily on the manufacturing sector, looking at firms that supply or compete with 
MNCs. Their causal mechanism, explaining and predicting positive spillover effects from MNC 
competition, is very similar to the one used by Bhagwati and Panagariya and adapted for use in 
this study. Managers who have received training from MNCs will be exposed to more advanced 
technologies and managerial tactics than those who were trained exclusively by domestic firms. 
After leaving the MNC, these managers are able to join or start-up domestic firms, either 
competing with their previous foreign employer or working to fill a gap in the supply chain 
(Vera-Cruz and Dutrénit, 2005). The authors find that occupying a managerial position within an 
MNC is a necessary component for developing the highest levels of technological advancement 
and competitiveness within a given sector (Vera-Cruz and Dutrénit, 2005). 
Trade and economic policy are central to the patterns of FDI in Mexico. The program, 
developed to replace the Bracero Program in the 1960s, greatly reduced costs to MNCs operating 
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in Mexico’s manufacturing sector. This incentive was achieved with a special tariff placed only 
on the value added by Mexican laborers during re-importation of a given good. Raw materials 
used to produce the good were not taxed during importation to Mexico (Pacheco-López, 2005). 
This reduced tax, amplified by the creation of NAFTA in 1994, led to high rates of foreign 
investment in Mexico’s manufacturing sector. In her paper on FDI in Mexico, Penélope 
Pacheco-López attributes the attractiveness of investment in Mexico primarily to its location in 
relation to all of North America. Reinforcing this advantage is the relatively cheap price of labor 
within Mexico, which Pacheco-López argues works to further increase the country’s 
attractiveness to foreign investment (Pacheco-López, 2005). 
The concentration of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has been key for 
Mexico’s relatively successful economic growth. Despite the presence of a large petroleum 
industry, the majority of MNC involvement has been located in economic areas that have 
exhibited positive spillover effects to the market overall. Unlike Venezuela, where a third of FDI 
is concentrated in extractive industries, the majority of MNCs operating in Mexico are in the 
manufacturing sector (Pacheco-López, 2005). In sum, we would expect to see the development 
of a large middle class within Mexico, consistent with H1, H2, H4, and H5. In the data, there is a 
strong relationship between increased amounts of FDI and the income share held by the middle 
20% of citizens. This relationship is likely due to the positive spillover effects of MNCs 
operating within Mexico’s manufacturing sector. 
  
Venezuela: 
In almost every aspect besides income distribution, Venezuela is an outlier. This 
phenomenon can likely be attributed to a simple and profound difference between it and the 
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other countries in the sample: oil. As Ross has shown, a petroleum industry can have long lasting 
and profound effects on a country’s development trajectory (Ross, 2012). The other large oil 
exporter in this sample is Mexico; however, several key differences exist between Mexico and 
Venezuela that may account for their different traits. First, Mexico’s economy is far more 
diversified than Venezuela’s. Mexico both refines and exports its own finished petroleum; in 
contrast, Venezuela only exports crude oil.  Mexico has also taken steps to both privatize and 
distance itself from Pemex, the state oil company, in contrast to the strong government control 
over oil seen in Venezuela. Although the Mexican government receives a substantial sum of tax 
revenue from Pemex — approximately 62% of its revenues — Pemex’s overall share of 
Mexico’s exports has dropped from 61.6% in 1980 to 7.3% in 2000. By contrast, petroleum 
exports make up over 60% of Venezuela’s total exports in 2000, and over half of its total GDP. 
This is a profound distinction. Venezuela’s economy is far more tied to international petroleum 
markets than any other country in the sample, making it more susceptible to fluctuations in 
international prices and by implication to international monetary crises, as we see evidenced by 
Venezuela today (Dunning, 2008). 
Venezuela exhibits starkly different relationships between FDI and economic 
development to those in Mexico. In keeping with this essay’s alternate hypothesis, case study 
research seems to indicate that a large contributing factor to the lack of positive spillover effects 
of FDI in Venezuela is the form that FDI has taken. Unlike in Mexico, the majority of FDI is 
located outside of manufacturing. A third of total FDI flows into Venezuela is located in the 
manufacture of petroleum. Less than 30% of total FDI is in traditional manufacturing. This has 
significant ramifications for the relationship between FDI and economic development in 
Venezuela. 
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Brian J. Aitken and Ann E. Harrison explore the relationship between FDI inflows and 
domestic businesses in Venezuela. They find that those firms who have formed joint ventures 
with MNCs capture the majority of benefits realized by Venezuelan firms (Aitken and Harrison, 
1999). This runs contrary to H1-5, supporting the alternative hypothesis. We would expect to see 
a strong relationship between FDI inflows and the success of domestic businesses through 
spillover effects and increased access to technology and managerial strategies. In short, we 
would expect Venezuela to exhibit similar tendencies to those of Mexico. Both countries have 
nationalized oil industries and monopolistic primary producers with very similar nominal 
revenue rates. The main difference is in how FDI has invested in the country. As Thad Dunning 
points out, MNCs seeking investment opportunities in Venezuela were offered joint ventures and 
investment opportunities with PDVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company (Dunning, 2008). As a 
result, the majority of benefits to Venezuelan firms were concentrated in those firms that were 
able to participate in joint investment ventures with MNCs. The firms that benefited were small, 
with 50 or fewer employees. The firms that attracted direct investment were often already highly 
efficient. This contributed to a crowding-out effect. Larger and wholly domestically owned firms 
suffered greatly, losing market control to smaller and jointly owned companies (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999). 
Furthermore, Aitken and Harrison demonstrate that there is nothing to suggest the 
existence of positive spillover effects in technology or efficiency of production from increased 
FDI (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Because the benefits of MNC involvement were concentrated 
in small, highly efficient joint ventures, and the costs largely diffused across most domestically 
owned firms, the net effect of increasing FDI was negligible. Considering this, we would not 
expect to see the same sort of positive relationships between FDI inflows and economic 
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development. If, in general, the majority of domestically owned Venezuelan firms suffer losses 
from increased FDI, higher levels of foreign investment would be associated with lower levels of 
employment, not higher. The data in this study reinforces this inverted dynamic, supporting the 
alternative hypothesis. 
Similar to Mexico’s case, economic policy has played an important role in Venezuela’s 
development. Dunning shows that starting in the 1960’s the Venezuelan government was able to 
pursue democratic and economic development, without addressing the central issue of inequality, 
by utilizing oil rents. Through the utilization of general welfare programs financed by oil rents, 
and not taxable income, the Venezuelan economy was able to grow without being forced to 
address high levels of inequality. This same dynamic does not exist in Mexico. Though PEMEX 
brings in substantial rents for the Mexican government, the majority of government money 
comes from taxable income. This has been the result of economic policy focused on bolstering 
the growth of a large middle class in order to form a substantial tax base. In Venezuela, the same 
has not been the case. There is a large informal market, and due to the relative lack of need for 
taxes on incomes, the government is not responsive to pressure for wealth distribution and 
income equality. Over the last decade, financial crises and decreasing oil revenues have led to 
increasing political tensions in Venezuela over rising inequality. 
In sum, due to concentration of FDI in extractive industries in Venezuela, there is no 
relationship or spillover effect between domestic and foreign business. As a result, the causal 
mechanism does not function properly in Venezuela. MNC presence neither positively nor 
negatively effects levels of inequality. What is clear is that there is no evidence to suggest 
technological or efficiency spillovers in Venezuela as a result of MNC involvement. 
Comparing Mexico and Venezuela, two main takeaways about oil production are 
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apparent. First: diversification is key. The actual size of the extractive industry does not appear 
to matter nearly as much as its dominance over incoming FDI. If a large portion of MNC 
investment is in extractive industry, the relationships hypothesized in H1-5 will likely not hold 
true. As in the case of Mexico, diversification of MNC investment into productive 
multinationalism can greatly dilute the negative impact of extractive MNC investment. The 
alternative hypothesis appears robust in Venezuela and not in Mexico, suggesting that what 
matters is not necessarily the existence or absence of an extractive industry, but rather the 
relative share of foreign investment it is attracting. This is an important finding, as it does not 
prohibit the development of an extractive industry. Rather, it demonstrates the need for 
diversification of FDI across a range of industries that are accessible to domestic businesses.  
Second: extractive multinationalism allows a host country to ignore pressing issues of 
inequality. By enabling a country to develop without growing a strong tax base or generating any 
redistributive institutions, extractive multinationalism greatly complicates future movements 
toward productive or high-tech multinational investment. This is the direct result of government 
reliance on extractive multinationalism to fund its programs. As more revenue is gathered from 
extractive MNCs (as a percentage of total government revenues), it becomes increasingly costly 
for the government to move away from extractive multinational dominance. This cycle will 
continue until an exogenous shock forces the government to address latent issues of inequality 
not resolved by an extractive multinational system. 
 
Colombia: 
Comparing Colombia and Costa Rica shows the delayed effects of switching from 
productive to either extractive or high-tech multinationalism. Both countries employed similar 
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development strategies in the wake of colonialism, but policy shifts through the 1970’s and 
1980’s have led to distinct development trajectories. In both countries, policies implemented in 
the early 2000’s to encourage MNC investments have had remarkably similar outcomes despite 
the dramatically different form of multinational production undertaken. Colombia’s extractive 
industries offer an interesting comparison to Costa Rica’s high-tech focused ones, and its civil 
war allows for a discussion of multinationalism in countries with intense danger and uncertainty. 
On the surface, the data in Table 1 shows a significant correlation between inflows of FDI and 
increases in average gross national incomes. The relationship persists when accounting for FDI’s 
share of Colombia’s overall GDP. However, this increase belies an important dynamic at work 
within Colombia’s economy: although increasing overall levels of income and absolute levels of 
income held by each strata of the society, FDI inflows have had no effect on wealth 
redistribution (see Table 2). Similar to the case of Venezuela, there is no evidence in the data to 
suggest that MNC investment has led to any relative income gains by any one group over any 
other. 
In order to explore this dynamic, we turn to a more in-depth look at the form and function 
of MNC capital flows to Colombia. In the initial wave of MNC investment in Colombia (1994-
2000), 60% of FDI went to the service sector, of that amount, the majority went into airport 
services and telecommunications, 30% went to manufacturing, 9% to oil, mining, and mineral 
extraction, and 1% to agricultural production (Kalin, 2009). In the period that followed (2001-
2006), oil, mining, and mineral extraction rose to 47% of FDI inflows, while manufacturing and 
service sector investment dropped by 11% and 26% respectively (Kalin, 2009). This shift, from 
service sector and manufacturing investment to mineral extraction has had significant 
ramifications for the Colombian economy. 
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In 2005, Colombia was ranked the fifth largest crude producer in Latin America, 
contributing to about 5% of total crude output of the region (Torres, 2005), thereby increasing its 
importance to the overall economy. Although a relatively modest producer of crude oil, oil 
exports rose to around 25% of total Colombian exports in that year (Torres, 2005). In addition to 
its petroleum production, Colombia is the largest producer of coal in Latin America, contributing 
to 70% of total Latin American coal production. In 2004, FDI inflows rose in Colombia by 73%. 
Of that total, over three fourths went to mining and petroleum extraction, and of that, 41.5% 
went toward mining alone. In that same year, mineral exports made up an additional 22% of total 
Colombian exports, alongside the 25% generated by crude exports (Torres, 2005). Although a 
single state-owned company, Ecopetrol, initially handled petroleum production, legislation 
passed in 2003 removed prohibitions on private sector investment. As a result, MNCs were able 
to enter the market without having to work with or through Ecopetrol.  
The implication here is that, unlike Mexico, where a large majority of FDI has gone to 
manufacturing and the service sector, high levels of investment into extractive industries will not 
generate the positive linkages between MNC involvement and upward mobility and improved 
standards of living of the poor encapsulated by H1-5. The data in Table 2 reflects this 
proposition, showing no relationship between income redistribution and FDI inflows. Our 
alternative hypothesis that economies that feature high levels of investment in extractive 
industries will not show strong relationships between income redistribution appears to hold true. 
In short, the resource curse demonstrated by Ross seems to have afflicted Colombian 
development. 
Building upon resource curse literature, a study by Nazih Richani finds that MNCs have 
contributed in two significant ways to the 40-year conflict in Colombia between guerilla forces, 
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paramilitary groups, government troops, and drug cartels. Adapting the rhetoric of resource curse 
literature, Richani shows that the underlying distribution of resources among social classes, 
regions, and ethnic groups has caused the development of ‘war systems,’ or patterns of violent 
interactions among different actors over sustained periods (Richani, 2005). A central player in 
Richani’s war systems is the MNC. According to this work, multinationals have contributed in 
three main ways to the development and perpetuation of the conflict in Colombia. Principally, 
MNCs operating in mineral and petroleum extraction have greatly disrupted the Colombian 
peasant economy, spurring violent conflict and formalizing struggles over land. Secondly, MNCs 
fund the central players in the conflict, perpetuating the war system without jeopardizing returns 
on FDI. Finally, by providing funding to militarized groups in order to ensure steady and stable 
investment, MNCs have internationalized the conflict, further cementing the war systems 
(Richani, 2005).  
The most obvious group of MNCs complicit in this dynamic is private security 
companies, mercenaries that primarily contract out to MNCs and the Colombian government. 
However, the most influential group of MNCs in the perpetuation of war systems within 
Colombia are those engaged in extractive mineral production. By displacing large numbers of 
peasant laborers through land seizures and increasing the relative wage gap in rural areas (MNC 
employees receive on average three times the wages of rural laborers), extractive MNCs have 
contributed to increased rural poverty (82.6% living on less than $2 per day) and rural violence 
(Richani, 2005). The suddenness of this shift has galvanized violent conflicts and contributed to 
rising homicide rates in Colombia’s rural communities. In order to ensure continued long-run 
safe investment, extractive MNCs fund paramilitary and guerilla groups alike, providing both 
sides with weapons and money, thereby deepening and extending the conflict. 
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In Colombia’s development, we can see the detrimental impact that FDI in extractive 
industries can have. It is important to note that although crude exports make up a sizable portion 
of Colombia’s GDP, it is not considered a petrostate. In comparison to our other cases, it appears 
that what matters most is not the absolute amount of funding going toward extractive industries, 
but rather the form of investment (private vs. public ownership of firms receiving funding), and 
its relative weight in the overall economy. Mexico’s crude production far outstrips that of 
Colombia; however, due to the high level of FDI in Mexican manufacturing, the impact of a 
large oil sector is diluted. 
  
Costa Rica: 
Costa Rica differs from Colombia and Venezuela in that instead of encouraging MNC 
investment in mineral extraction, Costa Rican policy has focused on encouraging investment in 
high-tech manufacturing. As a result of ISI policies enacted throughout the 1950s and 60s, Costa 
Rica significantly boasted higher levels of education. Capitalizing on its stock of highly skilled 
labor, Costa Rica began an aggressive campaign to attract efficient FDI (Giuliani, 2008). The 
MNCs that began to invest in the Costa Rican economy during this period were primarily 
concerned with exporting back to metropole economies. The fundamental difference between 
efficient and extractive FDI is the level of education required by periphery economy laborers. 
The model suggests that the existence of backward linkages between efficient investment MNCs 
and domestic business in host economies is vital. Increasing levels of FDI into high-tech 
industries will correlate with increased levels of technological efficiency for domestic 
businesses, a strong positive impact of efficient investment MNCs that is not present with 
extractive production MNCs. Policies aimed at increasing rates of high-tech investment began in 
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the wake of the 1970’s oil shocks. Initially the Costa Rican government decided to focus on the 
formation of an apparel manufacturing export industry. While Colombia began privatizing its 
extractive industries and opening up mineral extraction and petroleum production to foreign 
investment, Costa Rica retained relatively minimal levels of privatization. By introducing export 
subsidies, reducing import tariffs, and expanding free processing zones, Costa Rica was able to 
grow its fledgling apparel industry up to 36% of total Costa Rican exports by 1994 (Giuliani, 
2008). Unfortunately, the apparel industry proved too low value, and was unable to successfully 
revitalize domestic production. 
The question then arises, is there evidence of these backward linkages in Costa Rica? The 
answer is, unfortunately, no. Unlike the highly interconnected domestic and international 
manufacturing seen in Mexico’s maquila system, only about 5% of inputs processed by high-tech 
MNCs in Costa Rica were procured locally, and only half of those were actually produced within 
Costa Rica (Giuliani, 2008). There appears to be very limited transfers of technology or skills 
between MNCs and domestic firms. In fact, most of the transfers that do occur are horizontal 
exchanges between MNCs, often between competitors (Giuliani, 2008). The transfers that do 
occur are generally bi-directional and take place between domestic firms and those MNCs that 
have been present since the days of ISI. This suggests a temporal distinction between long run, 
market-seeking MNCs, and efficiency focused MNCs. 
The lack of backward linkages has an important policy implication for the Costa Rican 
government. Resources would be best spent on increasing the knowledge base, rather than on 
encouraging continued investment into high-tech manufacture in the hope of backward linkages 
(Giuliani, 2008). Despite high levels of education, Costa Rican workers are often unable to meet 
the needs of high tech MNCs. Although in general MNCs are satisfied with proficiency of Costa 
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Rican employees’ use of email, information acquisition, word processor proficiency, spreadsheet 
utilization, and database management skills, they were highly dissatisfied with problem-solving, 
scientific and mathematic, business administration, and foreign language skills (Monge-
González and González-Alvarado, 2007). Analysis of degrees offered by Costa Rican 
universities indicates that degrees earned are largely in areas other than those that would be more 
relevant for Costa Rica’s transition to a knowledge-based economy. 
When comparing Costa Rica and Colombia, we see a great deal of similarities in Figures 
2 and 4, as well as in the lack of linkages between MNC activity and domestic business. This is a 
startling and important takeaway message. Our hypotheses assumed, incorrectly, that productive 
and high-tech multinationalism would have very similar effects on the lives of workers in host 
countries (the Alt H only applied to oil FDI). What we see is that high-tech and extractive 
multinationalism have much more in common with one another than either does with productive 
multinationalism. This brings us to a second takeaway message from this comparison, linking 
institutions matter. We have seen some of this in the previous example of Mexico and 
Venezuela, but it becomes abundantly clear when approaching Colombia and Costa Rica. The 
main structural feature distinguishing MNC investment in extractive industries from investment 
in labor-intensive manufacturing is demand for a large quantity of unskilled or low-skilled labor. 
This crucial element is also missing in high-tech multinationalism, where companies require 
highly trained workers in target fields of specialization. Without a connection between a large 
portion of the host country’s workforce and an MNC, the positive relationships in H1-5 will not 
hold true. 
 
Honduras: 
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Honduras is an important point of comparison because it is the most impoverished nation 
in Latin America with the highest poverty headcount ratio in the region and therefore allows us 
to explore how widespread poverty may amplify or distort the causal relationships addressed by 
the hypotheses. While not included in NAFTA, it is a member of CAFTA-DR (Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement), a treaty aimed primarily at reducing tariff 
barriers to U.S. manufactured goods and agricultural products. As part of this agreement, it has 
implemented its own version of the maquila program, permitting a comparison of the success of 
the program in a variety of national income levels (Mexico, Costa Rica, and Honduras). 
Honduras’ maquila program also offers an interesting point of comparison with the development 
strategy of Guatemala, which has not implemented a program to encourage productive 
multinationalism. 
Historically, FDI flowed into Honduras’ agricultural sector. This extractive 
multinationalism contributed to high rates of inequality, low levels of domestic capital 
accumulation, and operated as predicted in Evans’ account of extractive multinationalism 
(Evans, 1979). In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the region in the late 1980’s, the new 
Honduran government sought to build a taxable base of middle-income workers. Through the 
1990s a textile-manufacturing sector developed, attracting productive multinational investment. 
The maquila program implemented as a part of CAFTA-DR focused on increasing FDI inflows 
to this sector. 
Race to the Bottom theorists have strongly criticized this trade agreement, citing concerns 
over a lack of language guaranteeing working conditions and the lack of regulatory ability on the 
part of the Honduran government to enforce what laws did exist. In a response to their criticisms, 
the Honduran government passed a series of minimum wage laws aimed at combating the 
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downward pressure on wages perceived to be associated with globalization. The minimum wages 
were targeted primarily at large (MNCs) and small (domestic) firms within Honduras, but did not 
include any language pertaining to informal or self-employed labor (both large areas of 
employment in Honduras). The minimum wage implemented in Honduras was the third highest 
in the region. T.H. Gindling and Katherine Terrell explored the impact these minimum wage 
laws had on workers living in abject poverty (Gindling and Terrell, 2010). They found that, due 
to a lack of efficacy in enforcement, minimum wages were only effectively enforced in by the 
government in large companies (Gindling and Terrell, 2010). This finding undermines the Race 
to the Bottom theory that host governments have little ability to influence how MNCs treat 
workers.  
Furthermore, they found that increases in minimum wages led to an overall reduction in 
levels of extreme poverty (10% minimum wage increase led to 2.2% reduction in extreme 
poverty) (Gindling and Terrell, 2010), but not reductions in poverty in general. This is likely 
because the majority of people living in poverty in Honduras were not employed by MNCs. 
Large firms only employed around 20% of the labor force, so any legislation targeted at them 
would have diluted effects across the population as a whole. They find that the benefits 
associated with higher minimum wages were confined to those working for large firms, and were 
not seen by employees of small, domestic businesses (Gindling and Terrell, 2010). Finally, they 
did not find any relationship between higher minimum wages and capital investments (Gindling 
and Terrell, 2010). This shows that MNCs will not automatically begin investing in higher levels 
of capital in order to increase productivity in response to higher minimum wage levels. This 
removes a serious danger faced by host governments when contemplating increases in minimum 
wages. 
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Viewed through a lens of CAFTA-DR’s effects on Honduras, we can explore the targeted 
FDI effects and trade liberalization. Honduras also provides a strong point of comparison with 
Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, allowing us to explore how differing levels of poverty and 
areas of MNC investment can affect growth and development. Samuel Morley, Eduardo 
Nakasone, and Valeria Piñeiro’s work on CAFTA’s effect on Honduras found that CAFTA-DR 
has had unequal benefits for different income groups based on area of employment and levels of 
education (Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro, 2008). In all areas, they found absolute increases in 
income levels, but they also found that the income levels for workers employed by MNCs 
operating within the maquila system grew at much higher rates. They attribute this divergence 
largely to the form of new jobs offered in each sector. New jobs in the self-employed and 
informal sectors were predominantly the same as those that had preceded them. On the other 
hand, jobs created in large-scale, productive multinational manufacturing required higher levels 
of skill and as a result compensated workers at a higher rate (Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro, 
2008). This partially explains why income inequality was largely confined to urban areas. Figure 
7 supports this finding, showing no aggregate negative relationship between FDI and income 
inequality. Data in Table 2 likewise shows no correlation between FDI inflows and the relative 
shares of wealth held by any one group. This supports H1, H4, and H5. We see absolute gains in 
general without a deepening of inequality. 
The most significant finding they present is the dramatic benefit the maquila program has 
had on Honduras. They estimate that by 2020, maquila industry in Honduras will contribute to 
employment growth of 4.5% (Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro, 2008). They find that this 
relationship is intimately intertwined with FDI inflows. As in Mexico, FDI into maquila 
manufacturing encourages the development and production of domestic firms working to supply 
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and compete with multinationals. By shifting some of the supply of human capital to an area of 
production with relatively high demand for unskilled labor, the maquila system employs a good 
deal of the supply of unused labor in Honduras (Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro, 2008).  The 
direct, tangible effect of this is that people who previously had no ability to work and no access 
to job markets now have a potential place of employment. Combining this finding with Gindling 
and Terrell’s findings on the efficacy and impact of minimum wage laws on multinationals, we 
see high potential for the FDI in productive multinationalism within the maquila program to raise 
standards of living for those living in extreme poverty. 
 
Guatemala: 
Guatemala is also a member of CAFTA-DR with poverty levels close to those of 
Honduras, thereby allowing for variation in one crucial dimension: mode of MNC production. 
Extractive multinationalism has dramatically affected Guatemala’s development. Historically, 
the majority of FDI in Guatemala was in coffee production. The industry did not begin to 
diversify until the 1950s, expanding to incorporate cotton, grain, and other crops for export. The 
plantation-based economic elite established during the colonial period persisted through the 20th 
century due largely to the ethnic divide between the Ladinos (predominantly urban elites) and the 
Indians (rural peasants). 
Carol A. Smith explores the evolution of this divide. She shows that the extractive 
multinationalism pursued by companies in Guatemala was a strong contributing factor to the 
development and perpetuation of this divided system (Smith, 1984). The lack of common 
ethnicity between political elites and the rural population prevented the development of patron-
client relationships. Instead, the only potential form of political power that Ladinos exerted over 
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rural communities was through extortion and political violence, alienating the rural populations 
from the urban government. In this power vacuum, plantation oligarchs rose to be the dominant 
political class (Smith, 1984). Economic development was concentrated in the capital city, and 
rural communities languished. Outside of cities, plantation owners dominated regional politics. 
The ethnic divide between urban and rural populations prevented free movement of peasants into 
the cities, forcing them instead into positions of subservience to the local plantation owner. 
Extractive multinationalism fueled this divide, strengthening the control of the oligarchs over the 
rural populations. 
When, in the 1950s and 1960s, MNCs began to invest in Guatemalan textile industry, 
FDI was concentrated entirely within Guatemala City, deepening the inequality and divide 
between urban and rural populations. Responding to FDI inflows into one specific urban center, 
Ladinos from more remote urban areas began to migrate to Guatemala City. At the same time, 
increased investment in extractive industries, both gold mining and agriculture provided enough 
demand for unskilled labor that rural populations were not encouraged to move to urban centers 
(Smith, 1984). This ethnic, cultural, and economic divide came to a head in 1960 with the 
outbreak of a civil war that continued until 1996. Throughout and in the wake of the civil war, 
extractive MNCs galvanized intense and violent opposition from the rural peasants. Gold mining 
companies specifically were seen as neoclassical conquistadores (Pedersen, 2014). Their 
presence continues to be protested throughout Guatemala, both peacefully and violently. The 
lack of connection between the Guatemalan government and rural populations is at the heart of 
this dynamic.  
Guatemala is an excellent example of how intense poverty and extractive 
multinationalism can intersect to deepen ethnic and cultural divides, alienating large groups from 
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their government. The core difference between Guatemala and the other countries in the sample 
is the development of ethnic and geographical gulfs between urban political elite and the rest of 
the population. Though some degree of ethnic difference between urban and rural communities is 
common in the other cases, the socioeconomic and social barriers preventing free movement of 
people into urban areas is unique to Guatemala.  
Two major takeaway messages are evident from the Guatemalan and Honduran 
examples. First, extractive multinationalism can lead to intense and systematic inequality 
between rural and urban populations, violating H1-5 expectations and again supporting an 
amended Alt H to include all forms of extractive multinationalism. This inequality has obvious 
and long lasting political and social implications. Second, and most important for our 
comparison, the addition of productive multinationalism is not enough on its own to achieve 
political, social, or economic enfranchisement. Compared with Honduras and Costa Rica, both of 
which had very similar colonial and postcolonial extractive multinational institutions, we see that 
without some form of public policy designed to connect rural labor to industrial development, 
the gains associated with FDI inflows will be highly concentrated and unequal. In order to 
combat widespread poverty, the Honduran government encouraged economic development by 
implementing a maquila program designed to connect domestic workers with productive MNCs. 
Rural workers were able to find jobs in multinational factories, connecting the labor force to 
FDI, and creating robust linkages. Guatemala, on the other hand, did not implement any such 
policy. The majority of FDI coming into Guatemala was in extractive production. The few 
Korean-owned maquilas built in the highlands were unable to offset the detrimental impacts of 
the extractive producers. Due to a lack of influence over rural communities, the Guatemalan 
government focused economic development policy on the capital, erecting a serious ethnic and 
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cultural barrier to rural workers accessing jobs offered by productive multinationals. Robust 
linkages between the unskilled and low skilled labor forces and multinationals are needed in 
order to achieve political, social, or economic enfranchisement through attracting FDI. 
 
Conclusion: 
Synthesizing the case studies and quantitative data, several main takeaway messages 
come into view. First, and most fundamental in reconciling core arguments from the literature, 
we see both absolute wealth growth for all observed income groups, with the exception of 
Venezuela, (H4 is supported) and unequal rates of growth (H5 is found untrue). Table 3 shows 
the relative significance of this relationship. Although on average workers in host countries 
receive higher wages as a result of increased multinational investment, the gains associated with 
that investment are not equally dispersed throughout the economy (see Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 
12). Therefore, we cannot completely reject the claims made by either Climb to the Top or Race 
to the Bottom theorists. It is clear that there is evidence supporting both points of view, and that 
the fundamental divide in the conclusions arises from their differing modes of analysis (relative 
for Race to the Bottom, absolute for Climb to the Top).  
We see that MNCs pursuing both extractive and high-tech multinational investment 
accentuate this divergence. The similarities between Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala 
highlight this dynamic. We see little evidence of backward linkages and easy mobility of low-
income workers into MNCs in economies dominated by both extractive and high-tech 
multinationalism. In order for the gains associated with MNC investment to reach the poor, there 
must exist a link between FDI and domestic workers. In its most simple form, the link is the 
ability for a prospective worker to get a job working for the multinational. When MNC 
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investment occurs in remote areas (oil extraction) or requires high levels of technological 
proficiency or training (high-tech multinationalism), it becomes increasingly difficult for 
workers, especially those in rural communities, to access MNC jobs. This lack of mobility 
cripples the ability of domestic businesses and workers to acquire sufficient capital and 
knowledge to compete with MNCs.  
This brings us to the second main takeaway message; it cannot be stressed enough how 
important the form of MNC investment is to its impact on the host economy. Extractive 
multinationalism robs the periphery of both capital and resources, creating tripartite alliances, 
and in the case of Colombia, directly financing a multi-decade civil war. Clearly, this form of 
development is neither sustainable nor desirable in the long run. High-tech multinationalism is 
not as detrimental as extractive multinationalism, although in practice it does have the potential 
to affect the host country’s economy in a similar fashion. The vast majority of the capital high 
tech MNCs generate or accrue will be channeled back to the metropole and the knowledge they 
gain will not be disseminated to domestic firms. We are left then with productive 
multinationalism. With Mexico as our sample case study, it is clear that there have been 
significant, tangible benefits accrued by Mexican citizens as a direct result of the maquila 
program and this form of manufacture in general. We have seen similar outcomes in Honduras. 
The contract-based support structure established by this type of MNC involvement has ensured 
the existence of backward linkages between MNCs and domestic producers. Without the 
development of backward linkages, high-tech MNCs will engage neither properly nor fully with 
the host economy. There are certain policy options that can help to mitigate this dynamic and 
help to repair the missing linkage between MNCs and domestic firms.  
This brings us to the third takeaway message: effective public policy is crucial. An 
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important point of comparison between Guatemala and Honduras is the necessary but not 
sufficient status of productive multinational investment. It is not enough simply to add 
productive manufacturing to an economy, there must be a public policy structure linking that 
new industry to the majority of the rural, low-skilled labor force. Venezuela and Guatemala are 
alike in that neither has strong policies encouraging the hiring and contracting of domestic 
workers and businesses for multinational production. Mexico and Honduras, on the other hand, 
have value-added-only tax incentives encouraging contracted manufacturing by domestic firms. 
Costa Rica has implemented similar policies, but has not done well at encouraging college 
students to graduate with degrees in internationally competitive fields. Without proper linkages, 
the gains associated with FDI will be, as in the case of Guatemala and Venezuela, confined to 
urban centers, and will therefore deepen inequality between rural and urban populations. 
Domestic businesses must have a way to access and compete in international markets. Policies 
akin to NAFTA and CAFTA-DR lower some of the barriers isolating domestic firms. They allow 
for increased interaction between productive multinationals and domestic businesses and provide 
incentives for MNCs to employ domestic workers. Linkage institutions are the key bridge 
between MNC FDI and domestic workers and businesses. Without this link, the causal 
mechanisms of Climb to the Top theories will not function; worker quality of life and FDI will 
not exhibit positive correlations.  
As a final note, high levels of inequality, either social or economic, compound upon poor 
linkage institutions, deepening the disparity in wealth growth between the top and bottom ten 
percent. We see this most clearly in Guatemala, where inequality has overlapped with a lack of 
formalized linkage institutions to effectively prohibit the migration of rural workers to urban 
centers in pursuit of more competitive or desirable jobs. In Honduras, the government’s lack of 
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funding has limited the scope of available policy options, hampering regulatory efforts. While it 
is important to understand how increased multinational involvement may reduce or deepen levels 
of inequality, it is vital that we understand how existing inequality may compound or amplify the 
dynamics we are studying. 
There is also a temporal element to MNC involvement that is often overlooked. The 
nature of global investment changed dramatically over the last forty years. We cannot talk 
properly about linkage institutions without understanding their evolution over time. There 
appears to be a strong, path-dependent quality to the development of strong linkages. Guatemala 
and Venezuela demonstrate the difficulty of creating these links in a short period. For Venezuela, 
the tax base required to effectively redistribute wealth and fund government programs in the 
absence of oil rents could not be created in time to ease significant social unrest and political 
turmoil. The Guatemalan case demonstrates the importance of developing these linkages before 
productive multinational investments are made. Without first creating a bridge for low-skilled 
labor to access MNC jobs, the Guatemalan government ensured that the gains associated with 
FDI inflows remained restricted to Ladinos. The longer a country goes without creating 
pathways for workers to access MNC jobs, the more detrimental FDI inflows will become. 
Tentatively, the conclusions of this study could be used to address the role of MNCs in 
the developing economies of South America and Africa. South America is the safest extension of 
this study, given the geographic proximity, shared colonial history, and interactions with the U.S. 
Given this work’s fixation on the form of MNC investment, Africa offers an interesting 
alternative set of MNCs. In contrast with FDI flows to Latin America, which originate primarily 
from U.S. companies, FDI flows to Africa are from a far larger range of countries, with 
investments from Chinese corporations almost equaling those of U.S. corporations in 2014 
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(United Nations, 2015). Many of these MNCs are a mixture of public and private ownership 
structures. This difference could affect the way Chinese MNCs interact with developing 
countries in Africa. 
I have not found enough evidence in these cases to definitive prove the claims of either 
Climb to the Top or Race to the Bottom theorists. Both theories are too overarching, too 
reductionist to adequately describe and predict the complex ways MNCs have affected the lives 
of workers in Central America. The true dynamic is highly nuanced and complicated. Poverty, a 
history of multinational involvement, current public policy, and modern modes of multinational 
production overlap, problematizing any comprehensive studies of the topic. Neither the Race to 
the Bottom, nor the Climb to the Top properly takes into account how the type of multinational 
investment influences development trajectories. The dependency and oil scholars do a good job 
of highlighting the negative impacts of extractive multinationalism, but gloss over, or fail to 
address the similarities between how extractive and high-tech FDI can affect a host economy. 
The Institutions Curse theory (Menaldo, 2016) attaches too much significance to public policy, 
overlooking the impacts of different types of MNC investment on the decisions of policy makers. 
Variation in form of MNC production remains a strong explanation for the variation in outcomes 
seen across the case studies.   
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Appendix 1, Figures 
 
Colombia: 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
to
ta
l w
ea
lt
h
Year
Colombia: Relative Wealth Distribution
Income share held by highest 10% Income share held by lowest 10%
Income share held by second 20% Linear (Income share held by highest 10%)
Linear (Income share held by lowest 10%) Linear (Income share held by second 20%)
-2E+10
0
2E+10
4E+10
6E+10
8E+10
1E+11
1.2E+11
1.4E+11
1.6E+11
1.8E+11
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
W
ea
lt
h
 in
 2
0
1
1
 U
SD
Year
Colombia: Absolute Wealth Distribution
absolute wealth held by top 10% absolute wealth held by bottom 10%
absolute wealth held by middle 20 Linear (absolute wealth held by top 10%)
Linear (absolute wealth held by bottom 10%) Linear (absolute wealth held by middle 20)
  
Moss 54 
 
Costa Rica: 
 
Figure 3 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
To
ta
l W
ea
lt
h
Year
Costa Rica: Relative Wealth Distribution
Income share held by highest 10% Income share held by lowest 10%
Income share held by second 20% Linear (Income share held by highest 10%)
Linear (Income share held by lowest 10%) Linear (Income share held by second 20%)
-5E+09
0
5E+09
1E+10
1.5E+10
2E+10
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
W
ea
lt
h
 in
 2
0
1
1
 U
SD
Year
Costa Rica: Absolute Wealth Distribution
absolute wealth held by top 10% absolute wealth held by bottom 10%
absolute wealth held by middle 20 Linear (absolute wealth held by top 10%)
Linear (absolute wealth held by bottom 10%) Linear (absolute wealth held by middle 20)
  
Moss 55 
 
Guatemala: 
 
Figure 5 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Figure 6 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
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Honduras: 
 
Figure 7 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Figure 8 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
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Mexico: 
 
Figure 9 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Figure 10 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
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Venezuela: 
 
Figure 11 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Figure 12 
 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
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Cross Country Comparison: 
 
Figure 13 
 
FDI on HDI 
HDI 
         KOF FDI 
Source: KOF Dataset and UN HDI data 
HDI is lagged 2 years. 
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Appendix 2, Table 
 
Table 1 — FDI on net national income and Gini coefficient 
 
Country FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Adjusted net national 
income (current US$) 
FDI, net inflows (% of 
GDP) on Adjusted net 
national income 
(current US$) 
FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Gini index World 
Bank estimate (%  
change) 
 
Colombia .961*** .740*** -.061 
Costa Rica .976*** .858*** -.047 
Guatemala .704*** .704*** -.834 
Honduras .940*** .826*** -.240 
Mexico .935*** .760*** -.224 
Venezuela .451*** .115 .199 
 
***, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .001 
Adjusted net national income is lagged 2 years, Gini score is lagged 5 years. 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
Table 2 — FDI on relative income share 
 
Country FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Income Share of 
Bottom 10% 
FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Income Share of 
Top 10% 
FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Income Share of 
Middle 20% 
 
Colombia .211 -.181 .121 
Costa Rica .484** .702*** -.457* 
Guatemala -.697* .630* .557 
Honduras -.078 -.215 -.025 
Mexico -.314 .657** .737*** 
Venezuela -.080 -.319 .057 
 
*, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .1 
**, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .01 
***, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .001 
Income shares are all lagged 2 years. 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
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Table 3 — FDI on absolute income 
 
Country FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Absolute Income of 
Bottom 10% 
FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Absolute Income of 
Top 10% 
FDI, net inflows (BoP) 
on Absolute Income of 
Middle 20% 
 
Colombia .943*** .947*** .956*** 
Costa Rica .978*** .970*** .974*** 
Guatemala .771* .784* .775* 
Honduras .804*** .923*** .897*** 
Mexico .861*** .891*** .908*** 
Venezuela -.030 .275 .238 
 
*, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .1 
**, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .01 
***, Correlation is significant at p ≤ .001 
Income shares are all lagged 2 years. 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
 
 
 
 
